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An Evaluation of Merricks’ Physicalism 
James Mitchell 
 
In Merrick’s article, he never provides any way of understanding how a 
person’s resurrection body is numerically identical to the earthly body on 
physicalism. His main argument rests on appeals to scriptural support, but it seems 
that scripture does not force a physicalist position over other positions. This paper 
will not deal with the supposed biblical support for physicalism, though it seems 
obvious from a quick survey of the verses Merricks himself quotes that the Bible 
leaves this question unresolved. In fact, he even says the verses in his article could 
be consistent with a dualist interpretation. Nevertheless, the key issue in this 
discussion is whether there are grounds for numerical identity on a physicalist view. 
Though dualism is not without its own issues, dualism does offer a seemingly 
coherent explanation of how a person can maintain numerical identity through 
resurrection. Merricks, though, does not provide any explanation of how his 
position can maintain numerical identity; and if physicalism cannot account for 
numerical identity after resurrection, then this would be sufficient grounds for 
rejecting it. Interestingly, in his article, Merricks even provides reasons for rejecting 
the few explanations which seek to offer a grounding of numerical identity on 
physicalism. Thus, Merricks’ article provides no reason to accept physicalism since 
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his position does not account for how numerical identity holds between a person 
before and after the resurrection of the body.  
One of the strange aspects of Merricks’ article is that he seems to undercut 
his own position throughout. He explains the positions which have historically been 
proposed in order to ground the numerical identity of persons through the 
resurrection, and then provides reasons for rejecting these positions. The best 
position which attempts to account for numerical identity on the physicalist 
conception is the reassembly of last parts view, whereby one holds the resurrection 
body is numerically identical to the earthly body due to the resurrection body 
containing the exact matter that the earthly body was composed of at the moment 
of death. This position—though it feels arbitrary—seems, nonetheless, to be the 
strongest position open to Merricks in order to ground identity. Merricks, though, 
raises all the objections to this position offered historically—some of the matter 
may no longer exist, some may belong to other persons at their death, etc.—and 
claims that the objections successfully refute this position.1 Thus, he does the hard 
work for the dualist in raising successful objections to, arguably, the strongest 
position regarding the grounds of identity on a physicalist position.  
In his other article, “The Resurrection of the Body”, Merricks rejects the 
spatiotemporal view of the identity of the resurrection body claiming that this view 
 
1. Trenton Merricks, “The Resurrection of the Body and Life Everlasting,” in Reason for 
the Hope Within, ed. Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 272-73. 
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begs the question by presupposing that a person cannot cease to exist and then come 
back into existence. I found this to be an insightful point on his part, yet I find that 
he may have slightly misunderstood this position and the reason for proposing it. 
One issue that physicalism has pertains to the question of how it is possible for a 
person to maintain numerical identity through uninterrupted earthly life (by 
‘uninterrupted’ here is meant a life without any temporal gaps). At the beginning 
of his article, he raises this issue but he never provides a sufficient answer. If this 
question cannot be answered on physicalism, then the whole position would seem 
to fall apart before even reaching the resurrection itself. The problem is that, if we 
are merely physical beings who are made up purely of matter, then how can we be 
the same person as our one-year-old self? Merricks asserts that we may maintain 
numerical identity through qualitative change over the course of life, but he does 
nothing to provide a reason for why this is the case or how it can be that we can 
assert identity in this way. On physicalism, it is not clear how one can maintain 
numerical identity through qualitative change at all. For instance, my current self 
has none of the same matter that made up my one-year-old self. I act differently 
and look completely different, though similarities do exist. Many of my qualities 
now are radically different than the qualities of my one-year-old self. On a 
physicalist view, the only way of grounding the identity between my one-year-old 
self and my current self seems to be through some version of spatiotemporal 
continuant theory, whereby one could maintain that a person is numerically 
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identical to their one-year-old self if they exist fully at successive moments which 
follow one another in an unbroken series from the first moment of existence—or 
something similar to this idea.  
At first, it would seem that this presupposes the inability of a person to pass 
out of existence and come back into existence while maintaining numerical identity, 
but I do not think this is so. It seems instead that in trying to provide a theory of 
how a person can maintain identity over the course of their life, the consequence of 
the view is that temporal gaps cannot occur in the life of a person while preserving 
numerical identity. It is the ‘unbroken’, or continuous nature, of the series of 
moments which does the work of grounding numerical identity, for the person in 
the prior moment ‘became’ the person of the next moment through slight variation. 
Over time, great change could occur while the person remains the same by slight 
variation over a number of successive moments. If you claim that a person ceases 
to exist at some time, implying a temporal gap, and then they come back into 
existence at another time, the gap seems, intuitively, to imply that the person who 
‘came back into existence’ is really just another person. This idea remains to be 
more fully considered. Nonetheless, it would seem that there is not much else that 
could ground numerical identity throughout a person’s life. Thus, when Merricks 
rejects this view by saying that it simply presupposes that a person cannot cease to 
exist and come back into existence, not only does he seem to misunderstand that 
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this is a consequence of the view rather than a presupposition, but he also seems to 
reject the best idea of maintaining personal identity over time. 
Though in “The Resurrection of the Body and The Life Everlasting” 
Merricks does not provide a positive argument for his position, in his other article, 
“The Resurrection of the Body”, he does provide one. The argument is given by 
Merricks as follows: 
1. Each of us—each human person—has physical properties.  
2. You are neither heavier nor lighter than your body; your weight is the same 
as your body’s weight. You and your body have the same shape. You are 
located just where your body is located. 
3. There is only one human-shaped object exactly and entirely located where 
you are exactly and entirely located. There is only one object with all of the 
physical properties had by you are your body. 
4. Thus, you are identical to your body.2 
The issue with this argument arises from what is presupposed and what is 
ignored. First, it seems that in the three premises Merricks presupposes that persons 
are identical to their bodies. The charge that Merricks made against the 
spatiotemporal understanding of identity can be raised again Merricks himself: he 
is begging the question. For example, take the second premise which claims ‘you 
 
2. Trenton Merricks, “The Resurrection of the Body,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophical Theology, eds. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 
482-83. 
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are not heavier nor lighter than your body’. A dualist would simply say that they 
are a soul, which has no weight, and thus the above statement is meaningless. Only 
if the self is purely physical does that premise hold. If the self is non-physical, or 
even not completely physical, the premise is false and the argument fails.  
 Second, the argument ignores one other widely-held proposition about 
human beings: human beings have mental properties. Merricks’ argument given 
above would have been made much stronger if he had added this proposition, for 
he could have enunciated a position which would explain these mental properties 
as being ultimately reducible to physical properties. Nevertheless, many believe 
these mental states that humans have are best understood as non-physical. If it is 
the case that human persons have non-physical characteristics, this would cut 
against Merricks’ above argument supporting the idea that human persons are not 
completely physical as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Thus, this argument is 
weak and seems to draw a hasty conclusion from insufficient premises. 
Next, one of the most difficult problems for Merricks’ physicalist view is 
Saul Kripke’s origin essentialism, as famously articulated in “Identity and 
Necessity”. Kripke’s basic idea is that when speaking of identity conditions across 
possible worlds, if a thing—his example being a lectern—had a completely 
different origin in another possible world, then it would not be identical to the thing 
we are presently referring to—namely, that specific lectern. Kripke explains 
saying, “Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could this very lectern have 
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been made from the very beginning of its existence from ice, say frozen from water 
in the Thames? One has a considerable feeling that it could not….”3 Kripke goes 
on to say that one could create a lectern out of ice from the Thames, but that would 
have been a different lectern.4 Thus, a thing’s origin is essential to that thing being 
that thing.  
Now, let us take a human being as an example and apply Kripke’s idea to a 
concrete example. If Merricks’ idea is correct, then someone like David Hume, for 
instance, has died and has ceased existence. At the present moment in time, David 
Hume does not exist, but on the Day of Resurrection David Hume is brought back 
into existence by God. In his earthly life, David Hume was born on May 7, 1711, 
to Joseph and Katherine in Edinburgh, Scotland, he originated from a specific set 
of two cells, etc. Now, on Resurrection Day, the David Hume that was brought back 
into existence has a completely different origin. This David Hume was not born in 
1711 to Joseph and Katherine. This David Hume did not arise through the union of 
two specific cells at all, much less the same two cells as before. This David Hume 
originated from a direct act of God on a day in the future. He did not pass through 
the birth canal, nor was it the union of two cells which caused the resurrection Hume 
to be conceived. The circumstances around his beginning to re-exist are totally 
 
3. Saul Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2nd Edition, 
eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 531.  
      
4. Ibid, 531.  
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different. Thus, with a totally different origin, Kripkean origin essentialism would 
infer that the resurrected David Hume is not numerically identical to the David 
Hume who lived in the 18th Century, and thus Merricks faces a serious objection 
to his physicalism.  
However, one could simply reject origin essentialism and deny that it cuts 
against the physicalist understanding of the resurrection. They could claim that, 
though the origin is different, the resurrected Hume is qualitatively identical (or at 
least sufficiently similar) to the earthly Hume—they share all the same traits and 
characteristics; neither one has any quality or characteristic that the other lacks. 
Therefore, they are still numerically identical though with two separate origins. 
However, consider a brief thought experiment. Let us keep Hume as our example—
he was born in 1711 and so on as mentioned above. Now, say someone is brought 
into existence who is qualitatively identical to David Hume during Hume’s life. 
This second person—call him Daniel Hume—has all of the qualities that David 
has; he shares all of David’s memories and traits. The only difference is that Daniel 
was born on a different day (for the sake of argument we can even say they share 
the same parents). It seems preposterous to say that they are numerically identical, 
for there are two separate people we are talking about. Thus, if they would not be 
identical in this instance, why would they be identical simply if their existences did 
not overlap in time? It seems that origin essentialism does, in fact, raise a serious 
problem for the physicalist claiming numerical identity through the resurrection.  
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At this point, let us briefly consider William Coward who argued that the 
resurrection body needs only to have ‘sufficient similarity’ to the earthly body.5 
Coward believed that one could cease to exist and then be brought back into 
existence at the resurrection, so long as the resurrected person was essentially 
qualitatively identical to the pre-resurrection person (apart from glorification that 
occurs at this point in salvation, I presume). What is particularly interesting in 
considering William Coward’s view is he ultimately concluded that numerical 
identity of the person was not required at the resurrection.6 This conclusion is 
telling for it pertains to the issue of qualitative sameness in the resurrected person. 
As argued above, it seems that qualitative sameness cannot provide for numerical 
identity, and Coward himself provides a clear example of this as he ultimately felt 
compelled to conclude that the resurrection body is not numerically identical to the 
earthly body.  
Further, in Continuants and Continuity, Robin Le Poidevin contributes an 
interesting idea to this conversation in the context of discussing two different 
theories of how objects persist through time. He makes the point, almost off-
handedly, that “with living organisms, at least, we observe an unbroken chain of 
existence from the beginning of life to its end. Things do not go out of existence 
 
5. Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from 
Descartes to Hume (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 91. 
 
6. Ibid., 91.  
Mitchell 10 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2020     Volume 5     Issue 1 
 
and then come back into existence again. With artifacts, of course, the case is 
otherwise.”7 The most striking aspect of this brief quote is that Le Poidevin simply 
assumes that Merricks’ position is false. He goes on to say that “where objects are 
not merely an arrangement of parts, we see only continuous existence.”8 Thus, for 
Le Poidevin, affirming that human persons are not merely physical organisms, and 
thus continuous existence is necessary for numerical identity, is an intuitive idea 
that we presuppose. His reason for this idea is that this way of thinking is ‘deeply 
entrenched’ in the way humans think about existence. This point is not 
insignificant, for our natural inclinations to think about things in certain ways often 
illuminate underlying truths. For example, my ‘deeply entrenched’ idea that the 
external world exists or that there exist other minds exterior to my own is held to 
be far more probably true than not. Therefore, we should not simply reject our 
natural way of thinking about existence and identity without strong evidence to 
reject it.  
These issues would not be as much of a problem for dualism, for the soul 
never passes out of existence and thus the person never passes out of existence. 
Dualism can explain how persons maintain numerical identity through the aging 
 
7. Robin Le Poidevin, “Continuants and Continuity,” Monist: An International Quarterly 
Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 83 no. 3 (2000): 
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pif&
AN=PHL1701432&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
 
8. Ibid., “Continuants and Continuity.” 
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process of the pre-resurrection life. Dualism is also consistent with origin 
essentialism, for the person only ever has one origin. Plus, to stretch Le Poidevin’s 
point a little further, the natural assumption or idea that many people have of 
themselves is that they are not completely physical. This may not provide 
overwhelming evidence for a dualistic conception of human persons, for it could 
be consistent with other positions such as emergentism, but nevertheless is it telling. 
Therefore, dualism seems to be superior to physicalism in accounting for a clear, 
coherent understanding of human persons and the resurrection.  
Ultimately, it seems that Merricks’ physicalism faces numerous problems. 
His assumption at the beginning of “The Resurrection of the Body and Life 
Everlasting” that numerical identity can hold over the course of one’s life and 
through the resurrection is never argued for or given sufficient grounding. Further, 
his positive argument for physicalism begs the question and presupposes that 
humans are merely physical beings causing the argument to be quite weak. Finally, 
William Coward and Robin Le Poidevin both (inadvertently it would seem) provide 
reasons to reject that physicalism can account for numerical identity. Ultimately, 
Merricks’ articles look rather weak since there is little positive philosophical 
argument for how numerical identity can be maintained. Hence, it seems one should 
reject physicalism unless it can be shown that these objections can be overcome. 
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